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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Policies to promote adaptation climate risks often rely 
on the willing cooperation of the intended beneficiaries. 
If these beneficiaries disagree with policy makers and 
programme managers about the need for adaptation, or 
the effectiveness of the measures they are being asked 
to undertake, then implementation of the policies 
will fail. A case study of a reset¬tlement programme 
in Mozambique shows this to be the case. Farmers 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department toto study the implications of climate change. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at through alotsch@worldbank.org. 
and policy-maker disagreed about the serious¬ness of 
climate risks, and the potential negative consequences of 
proposed adaptive measures. A project to provide more 
information about climate change to farmers did not 
change their beliefs. The results highlight the need for 
active dialog across stakeholder groups, as a necessary 
condition for formulating policies that can then be 
successfully imple¬mented. 
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In early February 2000, heavy rains started to fall across much of southern Africa, hitting southern Mozambique the 
hardest. On 9 February the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, was flooded, with slums in the peri-urban areas hardest hit, 
and the road north to Beira underwater. The rains continued, and on 11 February the Limpopo River, north of Maputo, 
broke its banks, contaminating the water supply and bringing dysentery to the local population. The worst came on 22 
February when Cyclone Eline hit the Mozambique coast near Beira, with winds of 260 km/h and torrential rains. Eline 
worked its way inland, dropping huge quantities of water on the Limpopo River catchment area. That water followed its 
way down the Limpopo River valley, and on 27 February flash floods occurred in the Gaza Province of Mozambique, 
arriving suddenly and burying the low-lying farmlands in the Chókwe and Xai Xai Districts under four to eight meters of 
water. Residents climbed trees and rooftops, but with only a few boats and less than a dozen helicopters available to 
evacuate over 100,000 people, over 7,000 of them were stranded in trees for several days. Eight hundred people died, 
hundreds of thousands were left homeless, and two million were affected. Over 90% of the irrigation systems in Mozam-
bique were lost. In the immediate aftermath of the floods, losses were estimated at $273 million in direct costs, and $428 
million in optimal standard reconstruction costs (World Bank, 2000). 
In the months following, after the waters receded, the government and the aid community began to ponder how to pre-
vent such a disaster from recurring. It had been the worst flood in 50 years, but there was concern that climate change 
could have contributed to it, meaning that the time until the next flood would be less. It was clear that something needed 
to be done to reduce the vulnerability of the farmers living in the fertile Limpopo River floodplain from Chókwe to Xai Xai, 
who were hardest hit. In addition to emergency assistance to help most farmers move back to their houses and begin 
farming again (USAID, 2002), policy makers began working on several longer-term ideas. First, they decided to distribute 
hand-crank radios to farmers, through which they could hear early warning information, such as a new color code 
system for cyclones. Second, they provided technical assistance to farmers to help them make their dwellings more re-
silient, such as by constructing granaries in the treetops, so that they would not lose all of their food and their seed from 
the next flood. Most ambitious was a voluntary resettlement program, planned and executed by the Ministry of Environ-
mental Affairs (MICOA) and the Ministry of Public Work and Housing (MOPH) at an estimated cost of $13 million (World 
Bank, 2000). The government built entire villages, equipped with modern services such as electricity, in the hills over-
looking the floodplain, for those living in the areas most prone to future flooding (Government of Mozambique, 2000; 
Mozambique News Agency, 2001). Farmers could farm in the scrubby land around the villages, or else walk or bicycle to 
their fields in the floodplain. At the time, the government admitted that the success of such a voluntary program was 
“hard to project”, since the fertile deposits in the floodplain would attract people back to the low-lying areas, though they 
hoped that people would indeed choose the “risk-reducing” option of the resettlement areas (World Bank, 2000).  
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Since there has not been a catastrophic flood in the Limpopo River valley since then (FEWS-NET, 2007), it is too early 
to tell whether the radio and resilient housing programs have succeeded.
3 The resettlement program, however, has 
failed. After a few months living in the new houses, farmers began to return to the floodplain to farm, and rebuilt their 
dwellings in their old villages. The government then encouraged them to maintain two homes: temporary ones near the 
fields, where they could live for several days at a time, and permanent ones on higher ground, where their families would 
stay, and where they would keep their possessions. But that too failed. The farmers wanted to live in the floodplain, and 
very few of them maintain households in the new dwellings that had been built for them. 
This was not the first floodplain resettlement program to have failed. There have been many such schemes in Asia, and 
while a few success stories exist, in general “this mitigation measure has proven to be less successful, costly, and eco-
nomically, politically, and socially insensitive” (ADPC, 2005, 100). It is also not the only type of policy to help people 
adapt to the threat of climate change, and climate variability, for which the implementation has been poor. Ironically in 
the Limpopo Valley a threat at least as big as flooding is of drought, especially in El Niño years (Arndt et al., 2003). 
There, as in many parts of southern Africa, the government and civil society have developed policies and practices to 
develop timely seasonal forecasts, to communicate these forecasts to potential “users”, and to recommend a shift away 
from water intensive maize toward more drought tolerant seeds (International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, 
2000; NOAA, 1999; O'Brien and Vogel, 2003; Unganai, 1998). But these policies rely on the assumption that farmers will 
actually use the forecasts. Again, while there have been some success stories, in general few subsistence farmers have 
made use of the forecasts, and most continue to plant maize, which requires more water than alternatives such as millet 
or sorghum (Suarez and Patt, 2004), but which also can be more productive when the rains are good, and which com-
mands a higher market price. 
A common factor in these difficulties implementing policies is the failure of the people who are most vulnerable to 
change their behavior in ways that policy makers think they should. There are three questions that arise. First, to what 
extent is it important that citizens support adaptation policies? Second, why might people not support such policies? 
Third, what can be done to increase the willing participation of people in adaptation policies? In this paper we examine 
these three questions in general, but focus our attention on the second. We report on an empirical case study in the 
Chókwe District of Mozambique to support the conclusion that different perceptions of relative risk can account for the 
lack of popular support for adaptation policies. There are good reasons, based in behavioral economic theory, to suspect 
differential risk perception. 
3 Based on evidence from the Zambezi River valley, however, there is reason to believe that new programs are helping. In 
early 2007, the worst floods since 2000 hit central Mozambique. While over 130,000 have been left homeless, there have 
not been reports of widespread loss of life, suggesting that early warning efforts have been successful (FEWSNET, 
2007).  
2 Background 
2.1  Adaptation and coping 
Climate change adaptation is increasingly viewed as an issue of risk management (Hellmuth et al., 2007). Risk is the 
product of the seriousness and probability of negative outcomes that might occur. Adaptation then is the process of taking 
actions to improve expected welfare by reducing the likelihood or severity of future risks. Adaptation is closely related to 
coping, which is the process of minimizing the long-term harm suffered as a consequence of negative events, without 
engaging reducing the likelihood or magnitude of the negative events themselves (Turner et al., 2003). If, for example, a 
community faces a risk of flooding, then an adaptation would be to construct a levy to reduce the likelihood of flooding, 
and coping would be to live in less valuable housing, that will be easier to rebuild to the same state should it be de-
stroyed. Coping is seen as a process carried out by individuals, which policy-makers can, at best, observe (Roncoli et 
al., 2001). Adaptation, by contrast, is a process that can be both initiated and undertaken either by individuals or by the 
state, depending on the specific measures. Building a floodwall is an activity for the state, for example. In many cases, 
such as the resettlement program in Mozambique, the state initiates the adaptation policy, but it is citizens who much 
change their behavior in order to implement the policy. 
Figure 1 presents two alternative models of the relationship between adaptation and coping. In Model A, policy-makers 
develop adaptation strategies in response to observed events independent of citizens’ coping. The policies are then 
 
 
Figure 1—Alternative models of adaptation and coping. In Model A, adaptation policies and coping 
strategies operate independently. In Model B, there is a close relationship between adaptation and 
coping, and a greater need for communication at the risk analysis and policy-development stages. 
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given to citizens to implement. Policy-makers can observe how well citizens are able to implement their policies, and 
conduct a vulnerability assessment to identify whether the policies have reduced vulnerability, using this information to 
improve the policy before the next event strikes, such that the likelihood or magnitude of the event is in fact reduced. In 
Model B, there is a close link between citizens’ coping and the development of adaptation policies. Coping here is un-
derstood not to be an autonomous process, as it is in Model A, but one that, like adaptation, requires risk analysis. In 
order for adaptation policies to be effective, they have to work synergistically with coping, rather than in opposition. In 
order to ensure this occurs, it is necessary to have two-way communication between policy-makers and citizens both at 
the stage of risk analysis, and at the stage of developing both adaptations and coping strategies. Feedback reaches 
policy-makers via the latter communication channel, relying on citizens’ observations of their changing vulnerability. 
Which model is the more accurate representation of the relationship between coping and adaptation is an empirical 
question, which can be answered by observing whether the existence of two-way communication linkages at the stages 
of risk analysis and response formation improves the outcome of policies. There is in fact a growing empirically based 
literature suggesting that they do (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). In a five-year study in Zimbabwe, for example, Patt et 
al. (2005) found that farmers were more than five times as likely to make changes to their established practices on the 
basis of new information when they participated in the process of formulating the list of changes, compared to when the 
changes were developed by expert analysts, and communicated to the farmers via radio and other media. One of the 
few projects that has successfully promoted widespread use of climate information to assist decision-making, in Mali, 
has worked because it has spanned 25 years, with a gradual process of involving more and more farmers in a process 
of social discourse at both the risk analysis and implementation stages (Diarra and Kangah, 2007). 
If indeed Model B is the more accurate, but policy makers proceed according to Model A, then it is likely that they will not 
establish the communication linkages that are necessary for policy success. The absence of communication can lead to 
the greatest problems—the development of adaptation policies that conflict with citizens’ coping strategies—when there 
are significant differences of opinion at the risk analysis stage. 
2.2  Behavioral factors influencing risk management behavior 
A schism in opinion at the risk analysis stage can occur if policy makers and citizens perceive risks, and what to do 
about those risks, differently. Why this could happen is the subject of behavioral economic and environmental psychol-
ogy research. Grothmann and Patt (2005) examined the role of behavioral factors in people’s decisions to take precau-
tionary action against the risks of flooding and drought. In one part of their empirical study, they interviewed residents of 
Germany facing the risk of flooding from nearby rivers. From these interviews, they were able to assign values to a list of 
socio-economic and psychological variables associated with each individual, as well as to identify the self-protective 
behavior each individual had engaged in, activities such as moving electrical appliances to upper-level floors. Using re-
gression analysis, they found that the psychological variables—factors such as feelings of control, optimism, and fatal-  
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ism—were able to predict self-protective behavior with significantly greater accuracy than were the socio-economic vari-
ables, consistent with previous findings of self-protective health behavior (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1986; Weinstein, 
1993). This suggests that a model of adaptation to changing environmental conditions based purely on the financial or 
economic ability to adapt, but ignoring the psychological factors that provide motivation to adapt, is incomplete, and po-
tentially misleading. 
Other work has examined how behavioral factors influence the perception of information that may be relevant for adaptation 
and development. Weber (1997) examined the conditions under which farmers in the United States were more likely to 
believe in climate change, and hence be likely to incorporate information about climate change into their decisions. She 
found that not just the type of information that they received, but also the number of sources from which they received it, 
influenced the extent to which they believed it. Additionally, whether a given farmers had a subscription to a daily 
newspaper or a farm journal made a large difference, with those people subscribing to a news source (rather than 
purchasing one irregularly) being more receptive to information about climate change. 
Others have called for greater research on the role of behavioral factors in development and adaptation. Nicholls (1999), 
for example, has argued that cognitive illusions play an important role in how people interpret environmental information, 
such as weather and climate forecasts. Similarly, Podestá et al. (2002) have suggested that mental models of climate 
and El Niño can highly influence whether farmers in Argentina use seasonal climate forecasts to guide their decision- 
making. Grether (1994) has argued that behavioral factors can play a strong role in the performance of agricultural 
commodities markets, a central institution of development. Bertrand et al. (2004) have argued that behavioral factors can 
help us to understand poverty and underdevelopment. Some have argued that a behaviorally-grounded reluctance to 
use new information creates a need for more effective practices of science communication (Klopper et al., 2006). Patt 
(2001) showed that farmers in Zimbabwe applied a common behavioral heuristic, probability matching, when interpreting 
probabilistic information about seasonal climate. Johnson et al. (1993) showed how biased perceptions of flood risk in 
the United States can destroy insurance markets; except in the immediate aftermath of a flood, people rate the likelihood 
of flooding as low, and do not purchase insurance even when offered at subsidized prices. 
Returning to the issue of adaptation as risk management, it is important to examine how both the seriousness and the 
likelihood of outcomes are perceived. Two factors may influence the perception of the former. The first factor is per-
ceived ownership. The endowment effect describes the additional worth people place in items that they currently pos-
sess, compared to items that they do not yet possess (Kahneman et al., 1990; Thaler, 1991). When taking an action will 
lead to both gains (acquiring something new) and losses (giving up something already possessed), people’s decisions 
will be dominated by the potential losses, and they have a propensity to do nothing. The second factor is perceived re-
sponsibility. The omission bias describes people’s unwillingness to take an action with potentially negative conse-
quences, even when taking that action will eliminate another risk that is at least as severe, out of a desire to avoid per-  
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sonal responsibility for the losses (Baron and Ritov, 1994; Baron and Ritov, 2004; Ritov and Baron, 1990; Ritov and 
Baron, 1992). People may choose not to vaccinate against a deadly illness when there is the possibility of the vaccine 
itself having negative consequences, even when the risks associated with the vaccine are far less than the risks associated 
with the illness it will prevent, because they assign more personal responsibility to the consequences of actions than 
they do of omission, and want to avoid that personal responsibility for negative outcomes. 
When decisions are framed in terms of negative outcomes, or a mix of positive and negative outcomes, the most obvi-
ous effect of the endowment effect and omission bias is status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Status quo 
bias describes a propensity to take no action that will lead to a change in the current condition or set of risks. When the 
salient effects of an action are viewed as almost entirely positive, action bias has been observed (Patt and Zeckhauser, 
2000). When demonstrating action bias, people want to take an action that will lead to a demonstrably good outcome, 
even when doing so will prevent an equally good outcome from occurring, or will indirectly allow an equally bad negative 
effect to occur. 
The second issue is the estimation of probabilities. People do not use mathematical formulae such as Bayes’ Rule to 
estimate probabilities, but rather use a variety of heuristics, or mental shortcuts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). One of 
these, the availability heuristic, is particularly important for estimating the likelihood of suffering future harm: people 
search their memories for instances of this kind of event occurring, and to the extent vivid memories are readily avail-
able, they will estimate the probability to be high (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). This can mean that both recent events, 
and those creating a more vivid emotional impact, will have a greater effect on probability estimation. Indeed, researchers 
have shown how particular emotional responses to events can lead to very high—and inaccurate—estimates of likelihood 
(Covello, 1990). Another important heuristic is representativeness: people evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring in a 
given place based on how representative the place is of places where that kind of event normally occurs (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). Hence, one might judge it more likely that San Francisco will suffer an earthquake than a landslide, 
because San Francisco is very representative of the kind of place that suffers earthquakes, and less so of the kind of 
place that suffers landslides. Finally, it has also been observed that people overestimate the likelihood of low probability 
events occurring, and under-estimate the likelihood of high probability events occurring (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
2.3  Hypothesized effects of behavioral factors on climate risk management 
The behavior patterns described above could lead to the type of policy failure seen in the Mozambique resettlement program. 
First, we suspect that farmers (relative to policy makers) may exhibit status quo bias. This is because, from the perspective of 
a farmer, any action taken to adapt to climatic factors entails some sort of risk of negative outcome. The decision to move to 
a safe area on higher ground, for example, entails the risk of losing one’s livelihood or community. The decision to plant 
a drought tolerant crop entails the risk of having a lower harvest, if the rains are plentiful. Farmers  
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wanting to avoid personal responsibility for negative outcomes will avoid making new choices. By contrast, policy makers 
can gain personal credit for avoiding a negative outcome, but only if they take action. If farmers survive the next flood 
because they were resettled, then the policy maker can claim credit. The policy maker who decides not to resettle people 
will be criticized in years of flood, and yet will get no credit for helping farmers in years where no flood occurred. They will 
be most sensitive to the negative consequences of doing nothing. 
Second, we hypothesize that farmers and policy makers will view probabilities differently. Policy makers will likely have 
seen gripping images in the media, especially on television, of people suffering from catastrophes. They will focus on 
these images of farmers stranded in treetops. Most farmers were not personally stranded in a treetop; they were left 
homeless, but managed to escape the floodplain before their own lives were threatened. The representativeness heuristic 
could also play a role. For many policy makers, the Limpopo River floodplain is a place defined by flood risk, and flood 
risk alone, just as San Francisco is for many people defined by earthquake risks. For the people living there, however, life 
in the floodplain is defined by many more factors than climate risks, and the floodplain less representative of the kind of 
place where climate risks are paramount. Relative to farmers, policy makers will have a propensity to overestimate climate 
related risks. 
3  Case study: adaptation to risks of flooding and drought in Mozambique 
We tested these hypotheses using qualitative and quantitative research methods. From a set of workshops held in May 
2006, we qualitatively observed differences in farmers and policy makers’ perceptions of climate risks. From a question-
naire administered in September 2006, we gained quantitative evidence of the hypothesized biases. From a household 
survey conducted in December 2006, we obtained data suggesting that a recent information campaign had not led to an 
observed change in perceptions of climate risks among farmers. 
3.1  Farmer and policy maker workshops 
In May 2006, we held a workshop with a group of 20 farmers in the village of Chiguidela, within a few hundred meters of 
the banks of the Limpopo River. The farmers told their stories of the floods as if they had just happened. They had to 
climb trees to avoid the floodwater, and then be evacuated by boat to higher ground. Those who did not do this died. 
Everything had been lost; the only way to identify where their houses had been, and what land was theirs, was by identi-
fying particular trees. A woman said that she had stayed in resettlement village for two months, but that it was 16 km 
from her fields, and there was nowhere to farm on the high ground. She had no choice but to move back if she was to 
continue to farm. She didn’t know if the floods would return, and she feared that if they did, she would not be strong 
enough to survive them a second time. But she had no choice but to continue farming her fields, and facing the risk. A 
man said that evacuating from the floods was not hard, but then upon return they faced a lack of food, and that was the 
hard part. He didn’t think that the floods would return within his lifetime, but if they did, he felt confident that he could  
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survive them, as he had survived before. His main concern was with growing more food, coping with the threat of 
drought. Several farmers said that they were concerned about a coming shortage of draft animals. They had lost all of 
their animals in the floods, and had been given new ones—oxen—to begin farming again. But oxen can’t reproduce on 
their own, and they needed breeding stock to replace the oxen as they grew old and died. 
Overall, the farmers seemed unconcerned about the risks imposed by future flooding, and more concerned about the 
problems they continued to face as a result of the policy responses to the floods. Moreover, the farmers seemed more 
concerned with less significant, but more constant, threats to their livelihood. Compared to our concurrent discussions 
with policy-makers, the farmers talked much more about the trend towards drier conditions combined with the inability to 
irrigate properly. The farmers were far more concerned about taking practical steps to address current problems, which 
included recurring drought, rather than reduce their risk from flooding. They did address the likelihood of a flood occurring 
again, saying that it was very unlikely. To the extent they wanted to take actions, such as to improve the irrigation system, 
it was in cases where there were gains to be had, rather than losses to avoid. 
Later during the same week we conducted a workshop with 25 representatives from disaster management and climate 
change organizations in Maputo. This group was made up of representatives from the national meteorological institute, 
the Mozambique Red Cross, the national disaster management planning agency, and international development organi-
zations. After introductory talks, we split participants into four breakout groups of six to seven people. Three of the 
groups were composed of stakeholders with experience in climate risk management: high-level officials charged with 
promoting adaptation, such as the head of the Red Cross climate program, the head of the national program to map and 
respond to environmental risks, and the climate program manager within the Ministry of the Environment. The fourth 
group, on the other hand, did not contain any such people. It was composed mainly of program managers in the area of 
HIV-AIDS and logistical support. These people were familiar with the issue of climate and disasters, but did not have any 
policy-making responsibilities in this area. We asked each breakout group to answer three questions: (a) what are the 
climate-related risks that they consider to be most important; (b) what are the adaptation strategies that they can envi-
sion for each of those risks; and, (c) what are the potential risks or negative aspects that those adaptation strategies 
themselves might cause. The last of these questions was for us the most interesting, and we were specific about what 
we were asking, namely the “side-effects” of the adaptations if successfully implemented, rather than simply the difficul-
ties that government agencies might have in implementing them, or the potential that the adaptations might not be as 
effective as hoped. While we were confident that these stakeholders had been considering the first two questions for 
some time, and their answers were not likely to be surprising, we were interested in observing whether their answers to 
the last question demonstrated as much prior thought. Furthermore, we wanted to observe whether there was a differ-
ence between the groups with topical expertise, and those without.  
Table 1 shows the top ranked answers provided by each group. The answers to the first question were the same across 
all groups, expect for the fact that the fourth group—composed of people non-expert in the field—only list two climate-
related risks, and did not consider the problem of cyclones. The answers to the second question contained greater varia-
tion, with different groups focusing either on improved analysis (e.g. risk mapping), top-down structural measures (e.g. 
improved irrigation canals), or efforts to promote bottom-up adaptation (e.g. education). No single group stood out from 
the other three in its answers to the second question. On the third question, however, the fourth group clearly did stand 
out. The first three groups, when asked to consider the possible negative consequences of their proposed adaptation 
policies, listed only the reasons why the adaptation measures might not be fully effective, i.e. challenges to overcome in 
Table 1—First three responses to breakout group questions 
What are the main cli  What are the main adaptation  What are the potential negative 










Poor quality of the evaluation 
Lack of adequate data for map-
ping 










Improve information on risks 
by communicating in local 
language 
Improve irrigation and water 
management systems 
Information may not be reliable 
Farmers may not believe the 
information 











Development of early warning 
systems and communication 
systems 
High cost of building dams 
Community resistance to change 
as a result of cultural issues 
High cost and resistance of 
communities to move to zonas 






For droughts: increased stor-
age of food surplus, and 
growing drought resistant 
crops 
For floods: population reset-
tlement in zonas siguras, and 
construction of elevated 
granaries 
Stored food surplus might be lost 
due to pests, drought tolerant 
crops provide lower average 
yields. 
Lack of adequate farmland and 
social institutions around the 
zonas siguras, elevated grana-
ries might be damaged from 
extreme climate events.   
implementation. These fall into roughly three types of challenges. First, these groups considered the challenges for policy 
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makers and analysts of conducting their job successfully, such as by providing accurate information. Second, these groups 
considered the potential unwillingness of farmers to implement proposed changes, such as moving to resettlement 
villages, either because of cultural issues, a lack of trust, or poor understanding of the information. Third, these groups 
considered the high cost of some of the proposed changes, and hence that the government may not actually be able to 
carry them out. What none of the first three groups considered—as if they had a blind spot—was the potential for negative 
consequences arising out of the adaptations themselves. This was something that the fourth group—the group with less 
experience in climate risk management—had no trouble examining, and all of their answers reflected this ease. If farmers 
actually did store more food in order to cope with recurrent drought, then that food might be lost to pests, making the 
farmers worse off than if they had sold their surplus. If the farmers actually did grow more drought tolerant crops, then they 
might get lower average yields than from growing the more water intensive varieties. If farmers did resettle, they would 
suffer from the lack of farmland and social institutions in the new villages. If they constructed elevated granaries to protect 
against flood, it might be that those granaries would be more vulnerable to high winds. 
The two workshops lend support primarily to the hypothesis that farmers demonstrate omission bias, while policy makers 
demonstrate action bias. Farmers were much more likely to draw attention to the risks and drawbacks associated with 
policy interventions, while policy makers—especially those policy-makers with specific expertise in this subject—were 
largely oblivious to them. This supports the hypothesis that omission and action biases play a role in creating different 
perceptions. The workshops provided less clear guidance on probability perceptions, our second hypothesis: farmers did 
indicate that they thought that the risk of flooding was low, in comparison with other threats that they faced, but from the 
workshop format it was difficult to draw any conclusions about the relative probability perceptions of the two groups of 
people. 
3.2 Questionnaire 
In September 2006, we administered a questionnaire where we examined probability and risk perceptions among farmers 
and policy makers. The questionnaire included three sets of questions. The first set asked participants to indicate the 
likelihood of ten different events occurring within their lifetimes. Some of these events were climate related, such as 
flooding and drought, and others were non-climate related, such as the likelihood of an African country winning the Football 
World Cup, or civil unrest occurring in a neighboring country. The purpose was to see how likely people thought climate 
related risks were, not by talking about them in the abstract, but by comparing them with non-climate risks. The second set 
asked participants to indicate the likelihood of several different events affecting farmers in the Limpopo River valley within 
the next five years, and over a five year period beginning 20 years from now. Again, these included climate events (flooding, 
drought, and cyclones) and non-climate events (e.g. losing a family member to HIV-AIDS). The purpose was to see 
whether participants expected particular risks to grow worse in the future than they are today. The third  
  12 
set of questions asked farmers to indicate whether these same types events are, in the present, becoming more or less 
likely. The purpose was to compare perceptions of the present with expectations of the future, and see if they agreed 
qualitatively. 
On all questions, participants indicated their answer on a horizontal scale. For the likelihood estimations, the scale 
ranged from 0 (will not occur) to 100 (will certainly occur). On the change questions, the scale ranged from –100 (be-
coming much less frequent) to 100 (becoming much more frequent). Seventy-five farmers from the village of Chiguidela 
completed the questionnaire, which took place in a three-hour sitting, with the farmers dividing into groups of 6 to 8 people, 
each being led by a facilitator who explained each question and helped illiterate farmers to answer them. The farmers 
filled out a paper copy of the questionnaire, written in Portuguese but verbally translated into the local language by the 
facilitators, and indicated their estimate by drawing an arrow to point to some place on the scale. Sixty-nine policy 
makers completed the questionnaire, and represented a diverse group of high-level decision-makers, program managers, 
and technicians. Many of these did so as part of training sessions organized by the Mozambique Meteorological Department 
and Mozambique Red Cross, completing the same paper survey as the farmers, while the remainder responded to an 
email invitation. The latter filled out the survey online, choosing English or Portuguese, and moving an onscreen slider bar 
to indicate their answers. 
The results supported the second hypothesis, namely differences in probability perception between the two groups. As 
seen in Figure 2, on the first set of question farmers indicated the likelihood of the non-climate events (69.1% on aver-
age) being higher than the climate related events (65.6%), although the difference was not significant (student’s t = 1.58, 
p = 0.12). Policy makers indicated the likelihood of a non-climate event being lower (55.9%) than the climate related 
events (60.3%), although the difference between the two types of events was only marginally significant (student’s t = 
1.96, p = 0.054) significant. When the difference between the climate related events and the non-climate related events 
is compared, the difference between farmers and policy makers does become significant (student’s t = 2.51, p = 0.01; 
Mann-Whitney z = 2.62, p = 0.009). Farmers indicated that the non-climate related events were on average 3.4% more 
likely than the climate related event, while policy makers indicated the non-climate related events being on average 4.4% 
less likely than the climate related events. 
On the second set of questions, farmers thought that the climate related risks would be less likely in the future than they 
are now, by an average of 5.8% (student’s t = 1.66, p = 0.10), as Figure 3 shows. Most of the drop resulted from the 
assessed likelihood of losing their crop to droughts, which farmers assessed at 70% likely today, and only 49% likely in 
the future. Farmers thought that the non-climate related risks would be more likely in the future than they are now by an 
average of 1.9%, although the change was not significant (student’s t = 0.94, p = 0.35). Policy makers, by contrast, 
thought that climate related events would be on average 7.7% more likely in the future than today (student’s t = 3.19, p = 
0.002), and non-climate related events would be 3.3% more likely in the future than today (student’s t = 1.68, p = 0.099).  
 
Figure 2—Average assessed likelihoods of climate and non-climate events, among farmers and policy 
makers. Error bars represent one standard error. Farmers on average thought that the non-climate 
events were more likely, while policy makers thought that climate events were more likely, and the 
difference between the two groups is significant. 
 
 
Figure 3—Average assessed change in likelihood of climate and non-climate events, among farmers 
and policy makers. The error bars represent one standard error. Farmers anticipate that climate events 
will be less likely twenty years in the future than they are today, while policy makers believe that they 
will be more likely. 
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While there was no significant difference between the farmers and policy makers for the changes in likelihoods for the 
non-climate events (student’s t = 0.36, p = 0.72), there was a significant different between the two groups for the 
changes in likelihoods for climate related events (student’s t = 3.29, p = 0.001 4). In short, farmers think that climate re-
lated risks will decline, while policy makers think that climate related risks will increase, and the difference between the 




















sessed rates of change in likelihood of climate and non-climate events, among farmers and policy makers. 
Error bars represent one standard error. Both farmers and policy makers believe that the risk of cyclones 
and malaria is increasing, while good harvests are becoming less frequent. 
We show results from the third set of questions in Figure 4. Both farmers and policy makers felt that cyclones were be-
coming more frequent (p < 0.01 for both groups), farmers felt they were becoming more frequent significantly faster than 
did policy makers (student’s t = 2.54, p = 0.012). While farmers on average thought that the risk of river flooding was 
increasing, it was not significantly different from an estimate of no change (zero on the scale) (student’s t = 0.99, p = 
0.33), whereas policy makers’ responses were marginally significant (student’s t = 1.80, p = 0.077). The same story ex-
isted for drought: farmers’ responses were not significantly different from no change (student’s t = 0.64, p = 0.53), 
whereas policy makers’ responses were significantly different from no change (student’s t = 2.93, p = 0.005). Both farmers 
and policy makers thought that the rate of good harvests was declining (p < 0.01 for both groups), and both groups thought 
that the risk of malaria was increasing (p < 0.001 for both groups). For both farmers and policy makers the answers to the 
third set of questions were consistent with the answers to the second set: the risks that are becoming more problematic most 
quickly in the present are also the ones for which the future is most worrisome. But the difference be- 
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tween the two sets is revealing. Policy makers see events changing in the present, and expect those changes to con-
tinue into the future, while farmers, at least for the climate-related events, do not extrapolate current trends into the fu-
ture nearly as much. 
3.3 Household  survey 
The third element of our empirical study was the analysis of a survey that was administered to gather baseline data for a 
Red Cross climate change program, and to evaluate the effectiveness of a first set of workshops that were designed to 
promote climate change adaptation. The workshops, which had taken place in the communities of Chiguidela and 
nearby Malhazene, had been motivated by the qualitative observation that many farmers attributed observed climate 
changes to supernatural causes, and that their efforts to adapt to the observed changes could in fact make them worse. 
 
Figure 5—Map showing the study area, including the two survey villages Chiguidela and Malhazene, the district 
seat Ch—kwe, the provincial capital, Xai Xai, roadways, and the Limpopo River. Image Source: Global Land 
Cover Facility, http://glcf.umiacs.umd.edu. 
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It was believed that by explaining to farmers the scientific underpinnings of climate change, their perceptions both of the 
problem and the effectiveness of their responses to it would change. A survey was administered in the two communities, 
with randomly selected participants who included both workshop attendees and those who had not attended the work-
shops. The study area appears in Figure 5. 
Of the 84 farmers surveyed, 90% said that they had noticed major changes in the climate during their lifetime, including 
changes in temperature (80%), cyclones (80%), rainfall (73%), soil moisture (69%), and flooding (64%). Only 16% of the 
farmers thought that the changes would go away, with 45% thinking the changes would definitely continue, and 39% 
thinking they might continue. While none of these data about observed changes or expectations for the future are par-
ticularly noteworthy, what is interesting is farmers’ beliefs about what had been causing the changes. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, farmers were much more likely to list the gods’ and ancestors’ being unhappy as the cause of climate change 
than pollution from outside the community. 
The motivation for the workshops had been qualitative evidence of the results seen in Figure 6, namely that people were 
more likely to attribute climate change to the gods and ancestors than to global carbon dioxide levels. Of the survey re-
spondents, nineteen had attended one of the two workshops, during which it had appeared that the farmers understood 
the information presented. Nevertheless, in the survey itself, a greater percentage of workshop attendees than non- 
 
Figure 6—Beliefs about causes of climate change. While about half of survey respondents thought that pollution 
from outside the community might be a cause of climate change, only 1 of the 83 respondents was confident in 
this. Many more identified their own behavior, the normality of change, and supernatural factors as being 
causes of climate change. 
  16  
  17 
attendees believed climate change being caused by the gods and ancestors being upset (63% compared to 31%), by 
farming practices within the community (32% compared to 11%), or by the naturalness of the changes (32% compared 
to 22%). Indeed, the one respondent who identified climate change as definitely resulting from pollution from outside the 
community had not attended either of the workshops. Of the workshop attendees, 47% thought that climate changes 
would continue, while 44% of non-attendees thought it would continue, an insignificant difference 
(2 [2] = 0.49, p = 
0.782). 
The household survey results are relevant for this paper for two reasons. First, they suggest that there likely are impor-
tant differences in how farmers and policy-makers perceive the causes of climate change, which in turn could influence 
the perception of future risk, and of the effectiveness of adaptation strategies. Second, it suggests that a strategy to “fix” 
these perceptions by providing accurate information will not necessarily be immediately effective. It has long been ob-
served that where any ambiguity makes it possible, people use new information to confirm, rather that disprove, their 
pre-existing beliefs (Lord et al., 1979), a pattern known as “confirmation bias.” The farmers who had participated in the 
workshops did not assimilate the workshop content—which included the information that pollution from outside the 
community was causing climate change—in such a way as to be increasingly skeptical of alternative explanations, but 
rather, apparently, to believe in their pre-existing beliefs more strongly. 
4 Discussion 
Both the qualitative results from the workshops and the quantitative results from the questionnaire and household survey 
suggest that there are differences in perception between farmers and policy makers, of a type that could lead to policy 
failure such as that observed in Mozambique following the 2000 floods. The workshops suggest that farmers and policy 
makers differ in their desire to take action, versus staying with the status quo, related to how each group views the po-
tential for negative consequences flowing from action. The questionnaire results suggest that there are differences in the 
perception of relative likelihoods. Farmers view climate related events as being less likely than the non-climate related 
events on the questionnaire, and while the climate-related events have become more frequent in recent years, they do 
not expect them to be more frequent in the future. Policy makers, by contrast, view the climate-related events as more 
likely, with that likelihood increasing in the present and continuing into the future. The survey results suggest that simply 
providing them information about climate change and climate risks will not easily change these farmers’ perceptions. 
Rather, the perceptions grow out of lifetimes of experience. 
These results lend additional empirical support to the proposition that Model B in Figure 1 is in fact the more accurate 
representation of the adaptation and coping process. They also suggest that real problems in implementation can arise 
when adequate communication is absent at the risk analysis and policy design stages, because of the potential for major 
differences in perception of risk. We have identified a number of behavioral reasons why such differences in perception 
may exist.  
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Unfortunately, the communication that is necessary to avoid the types of problems that occurred in Mozambique is not 
easy. The resettlement program in the wake of the 2000 flooding was designed quickly, by government ministries, in 
response to a pressing need. By contrast, involving citizens in the analysis and planning process can take significantly 
longer, at significantly higher cost. Since the failure if the resettlement program, the Government of Mozambique re-
quested assistance to start over, doing a better job, and the result was the development of a collaborative project with 
the governments of Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Botswana, funded by the Global Environmental Facility and the United 
Nations Environment Programme. They launched this project, “Sustainable Land Use Planning for Integrated Land and 
Water Management for Disaster Preparedness and Vulnerability Reduction in the Lower Limpopo Basin,” in late 2004 
with a total budget of $2.8 million. The project incorporates participation of the affected farmers in the process of assessing 
the risks to people in floodplains, and developing land use plans to minimize those risks in several targeted communities. 
While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of that project, early reports are that it is succeeding at stimulating a 
dialogue between farmers and national level planners on the issue of flooding and land-use planning (GEF, 2007). Spending 
nearly $3 million on a pilot project to engage in land use planning may seem like a lot of money, but it is significantly less 
than the $13 million that was spent, largely ineffectively, on the quickly-designed resettlement program. 
National governments, non-governmental organizations, and donors need to devote the resources to engage the local 
population before they engage in costly adaptation programs. It may seem like money spent talking, which could better 
be spent on concrete action. But without that talking, there is a significant risk that the concrete will be poured in the 
wrong place, and go to waste. Among certain communities this is accepted wisdom, and yet there are still those who 
believe otherwise. If it is expected that citizens will participate in the process of implementing adaptation policies, then it 
is vital to involve them in the process of designing the policies from the very beginning.  
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